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Introduction

The race is hardly responsible for French depopulation
because, far away from the metropole and the artificial
influence of civilization and customs, French people
once again become prolific.
—Charles R aisin, La dépopulation
de la France, 1900

F

rench defeat in the Franco-Prussian War was swift; in less than
two months of war, enemy troops had encircled Paris, captured
the emperor Napoleon III, and left the government of the Second Empire discredited. This humiliating defeat in 1870 resulted in
the unification of Germany, the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, the establishment of France’s Third Republic, and fears that France was on
the brink of becoming a second-rate power in Europe. The crisis that
gave birth to the Third Republic would influence its political history
throughout its existence; in the immediate aftermath of the war, patriotic French men and women turned their attention to their empire,
the declining birthrate in France, and the comparative demographic
strengths of rival powers in Europe.
It was therefore in the early Third Republic that Malthusian arguments in favor of fertility restraint were eclipsed by the growing belief
that victory over Germany in the next war would require a higher
birthrate. This conviction was shaped by statistical studies revealing the relatively slow growth of the French population over the
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course of the nineteenth century. For example, France’s population
grew by a mere 43 percent between 1800 and 1900; the population of
the United Kingdom had increased by 164 percent during that same
period.1 One of the principal causes of this inferior population growth
was France’s modest birthrate, which, in 1888, stood at 23.1, in contrast to the birthrates of 36.7 and 36.6 reported in Germany and Italy
that same year.2 Growing numbers of pronatalists studied the causes
and consequences of depopulation, pursued a vocal propaganda campaign, and convinced the government to pass legislation promoting
population growth through a variety of means, including financial
incentives, restrictions on women’s work, and protection of motherhood. In the twentieth century, pronatalists would work closely with
the government in extra-parliamentary depopulation commissions in
1902 and 1912; the Conseil supérieur de la natalité, formed in 1919 to
advise the government on demographic matters; and the Haut comité
de la population, created in 1939 to design new laws on the family and
the birthrate.
As the trauma of the année terrible fueled the pronatalist movement
in the first decades of the Third Republic, it simultaneously created
a desire to overcome the humiliation of defeat by establishing a vast
empire outside Europe. While commentators frequently described
France’s earlier colonial expansion as “accidental,” there was nothing
accidental about the colonial campaigns of the 1880s and 1890s when
France acquired new territory in Africa and Southeast Asia, greatly
expanding an empire that by World War I would be roughly twentyfive times the size of the metropole. In the late nineteenth century,
colonial expansion and settlement enjoyed considerable support in
France that extended beyond the usual colonial circles and impinged
on political discussions that ostensibly had nothing to do with imperialism. Though representing distinct political movements with few
prominent members in common, the colonial lobby and pronatalist
organizations of the early Third Republic were nevertheless born out
of the same crisis and reflected similar anxieties concerning France’s
trajectory and position in the world. As a result, the discourses of these
two groups intersected and presented similar conclusions.
2
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This book explores that intersection by showing, first of all, that
pronatalist ideas were an integral part of how colonial propagandists
and administrators pursued their goals of establishing a strong French
presence overseas and making colonies profitable. Pronatalism influenced how the Union coloniale française recruited people for settlement; pronatalist thinking led governors in places like Madagascar
to try to make their colonies more profitable through state-controlled
population growth and managing colonial subjects’ reproduction; in
large settler colonies such as those in North Africa, colonial governments considered pronatalist policies designed to encourage reproduction and support settler families to be essential to establishing
a strong and permanent French presence. Second, this book details
how demographic thinking about empire shaped pronatalists’ strategies and their proposed solutions to depopulation. In the early Third
Republic, many social scientists saw colonial settlement schemes as a
medical question based on a sophisticated understanding of demography, race, and acclimatization, a body of knowledge that would
determine whether or not the French could reproduce adequately in
the colonies. While many late-nineteenth-century experts outside
pronatalist circles produced pessimistic assessments of French prospects for establishing large settler colonies, those prominent statisticians and demographers directly engaged in questions relating to
depopulation were among the vocal advocates of French colonial settlement in the 1870s. As the pronatalist movement became more organized in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, pronatalists
increasingly understood their demographic crisis in terms that transcended the boundaries of the metropole and positioned their empire
as a key component in their nation’s regeneration. In short, not only
were French pronatalists aware of France’s empire, but they emphasized the potential demographic benefits of colonial settlement, studied the pronatalist initiatives of colonial governments seeking to make
settler colonialism viable, and collaborated with analogous organizations in the settler communities. By incorporating sources from both
the metropole and empire, including familialist journals from French
settlers in North Africa as well as archival material specific to colonial
introduction
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pronatalist policies, this book explores precisely why pronatalists came
to believe that the maintenance of a large empire with settler colonies
would be central to establishing demographic growth and strength.
Until recently, many historians underestimated the significance of
empire in metropolitan France and instead posited that prior to decolonization the French public’s interest in empire was fickle at best.3
Along similar lines, other scholars have argued that over the course
of the Third Republic, the French public became increasingly aware
of their empire but rallied around it only in times of crisis, such as in
1914 and 1939.4 More recently, as part of the “imperial turn,” scholars such as Gary Wilder have discredited the image of Third Republic France as “simply a self-contained parliamentary republic that also
happened to possess overseas colonies.”5 In particular, historians have
been interested in examining the significance of empire to daily life
in France, concluding that it was neither remote nor irrelevant but,
rather, figured prominently in the French imagination. For instance,
recent studies have analyzed the images of empire and the colonial
“other” that flooded the metropole in films, the penny press, advertisements, and postcards.6 Colonial exhibitions such as those of 1889
and 1931 speak of the popular fascination with the empire and its people.7 In the twentieth century, the colonial encounter was no longer
even limited to those travelers who ventured into the empire or visited
colonial exhibits in the cities; it also occurred in factories, brothels,
cafés, and the streets of cities as large numbers of colonial migrants
arrived to fill the labor shortage, serve in the army, or attend university.8 Collectively, these examples of colonial encounters and colonial
consciousness ranged from the spectacular to the quotidian, revealing
the interconnectedness of metropole and empire. They further suggest
that, political and economic considerations aside, French people were
not only aware of empire, but many encountered it on a regular basis.
Although historians have convincingly portrayed public interest in
empire during the Third Republic in terms of its impact on mass culture, few studies explore how this phenomenon in turn affected political movements that lacked any direct connection to empire.9 In his
study of French imperialism between the world wars, Martin Thomas
4
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explores public perceptions of empire among a group of people he dubs
the “imperial community.”10 Moving beyond official colonial circles,
such as the colonial lobby, Thomas applies the label “imperial community” to a group of people consisting of “politicians, bureaucrats,
colonial administrators, manufacturers, traders, media commentators, educators, missionaries, lobbyists and settlers that dominated
the political discourse of empire after the First World War.”11 This
book demonstrates that while French pronatalists were concerned
with political issues of a primarily metropolitan nature, namely, the
national birthrate, their engagement with this question nevertheless
brought them to discussions of empire that placed them clearly in the
“imperial community.” Visions of empire were so pervasive in France
during this period that pronatalists looked well beyond the borders
of the metropole as they imagined solutions to what would, at first
glance, be construed as a strictly metropolitan problem.
The first English-language historical study to address France’s crisis of depopulation was that of Joseph Spengler, written in 1938.12 An
economics professor at Duke University, Spengler began his study
by situating this historical topic in the politics of his day. He argued
that “within the next quarter century true depopulation—a persistent
long-run excess of deaths over births—will manifest itself in nearly
all the countries of Europe and in those non-European countries to
which Western civilization has spread.”13 Spengler detailed the demographic trends over the last few centuries, providing a number of
explanations for the low birthrate and echoing the arguments made
by French pronatalists. Like pronatalists, Spengler attributed the low
fertility rate to many factors, including urbanization, military service, women’s work, and the desire for social mobility. More recent
scholars have returned to Spengler’s work when considering pronatalism as part of their studies of sexuality, the woman question, feminism, the crisis of masculinity, nationalism, immigration, and the
rise of the welfare state. These studies collectively reveal the persuasiveness and importance of pronatalist doctrine during this period
and the fears that depopulation engendered.14 Departing from Spengler, they rightly emphasize, moreover, that the anxiety surrounding
introduction
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the birthrate reflected more than simply pronatalists’ stated fears of
military defeat and economic ruin; pronatalism was also a response
to concerns about gender identities and the changing roles of women
and men in society.
Though demonstrating the far-reaching implications of demographic
thinking in Third Republic France, scholars have thus far analyzed pronatalism within a specifically European context, focusing on France’s
rivalry with Germany and making few references to the empire. The
European focus most likely stems from the fact that fears of depopulation initially gained momentum following a specifically European
conflict, the Franco-Prussian War. In many other European states,
by contrast, pronatalism developed in the context of colonial expansion, and imperialism has consequently figured more prominently in
historians’ assessments of the topic in other national contexts.15 Anna
Davin’s article on British pronatalism, for example, positions the Boer
War as a key event that gave rise to concerns about depopulation in
Britain.16 In France, by contrast, the birthrate began declining at a
much earlier date than in Britain and became a national crisis prior
to the scramble for Africa and following a European conflict that had
nothing to do with empire. As this book will show, French fears of
depopulation, though born out of a European crisis, eventually evolved
beyond such European rivalries to include empire.
When discussing French population growth, whether in France
or in the colonies, race was central to how pronatalists made sense of
the demographic crisis. In this respect, Alys Weinbaum’s concept of
the “race/reproduction bind” serves as a useful reminder that reproduction and race are intricately connected.17 Applying this concept
to France and French colonies, we can see that pronatalists were primarily concerned with the relative strength of their nation, something
that they measured with data on French reproduction and population growth. A low birthrate among those they considered capable
of transmitting French racial identity to the next generation would
threaten the existing “social systems hierarchically organized according to notions of inherent racial superiority, inferiority, and degeneration.”18 Conversely, pronatalists would be inclined to interpret a high
6
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birthrate among outsiders, particularly those residing on French soil,
as the propagation of a rival social system with the potential to eclipse
that of the French. It follows, therefore, that race and reproduction
were intimately connected in these larger concerns about national
strength and maintaining a particular social order.
Still, having established that French pronatalists saw reproduction
in racial terms, it is necessary to consider what they meant when referencing “the French race.” Though seemingly self-evident in meaning,
the concept of “the French race” that regularly appeared in pronatalist
literature was an inherently unstable category, changing over time and
subject to conflicting interpretations. As historians have shown, the
notion of a coherent French racial identity was partly complicated by
the legacy of the French Revolution, which established shared culture,
language, and territory as the central elements of national identity.
Nineteenth-century theorist Ernest Renan was famous for emphasizing that constructs like race and ethnicity had nothing to do with
defining the French nation; this was a voluntary and subjective form
of nationalism that could be contrasted with the more biologically or
racially based nationalism of Germany.19 Though willing to acknowledge the impact of universalism on French ideas of national identity and citizenship, historians no longer accept this idea uncritically
and have instead assessed the importance of race as a social marker
in modern French history, despite official proclamations to the contrary.20 For the purposes of this study, it is essential to recognize that
throughout the Third Republic race was an integral part of how pronatalists conceived of the French population as a unified entity and
interpreted France’s demographic strength in relation to other populations. When discussing the need to increase the French population
in France, pronatalists had very specific ideas about who was French,
ideas that were guided by concepts of racial purity. For instance, after
World War I, André Michelin, a pronatalist and major donor to the
Alliance nationale, restricted family allowances to “French” employees at his company, denying such benefits to workers from elsewhere
in Europe or the colonies.21 This policy exemplifies how pronatalistminded Frenchmen such as Michelin saw reproduction in racial terms.
introduction
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Michelin had no interest in encouraging foreigners residing and working in France to have more children, despite the fact that French naturalization laws made it possible for some of these children to become
French citizens, thereby adding to France’s overall population growth.22
While this would seem to suggest a hostile attitude to immigrants
and foreign workers, this was not universally the case, as pronatalists’ ideas about who could be French or contribute to French demographic strength were malleable, changing over time and differing from
one context to another. The research of Elisa Camiscioli, in particular, has enlarged our understanding of how ideas of race intersected
with gendered anxieties to shape pronatalist views on immigration
following World War I.23 Camiscioli shows that despite the largely
nationalist character of their movement, interwar pronatalists welcomed the assimilation of select European immigrants, most notably Italians, into the nation as a means of strengthening the race as a
whole. Empire and, more specifically, colonized populations were not
a central part of the immigration debate, as pronatalists vehemently
opposed the immigration of people from Africa and Asia, whom they
considered incapable of being assimilated and consequently adding to
“French” demographic growth.24 Tyler Stovall notes, moreover, that
it was the very presence on French soil of workers from the colonies
that shaped evolving French views of “white” European immigrants
after 1914. Contrasting the “white” racial identity of the latter workers
with workers from the colonies, French immigration reformers were
more receptive to the arrival of Italians and other Europeans whom
they believed to have the requisite racial characteristics needed for
assimilation and absorption into the French population.25
This book will show that even as pronatalists saw a potential danger in interactions between France and its colonies (namely, in the
form of migration of colonial workers to the metropole), they by and
large supported imperialism. This is because pronatalists believed
that it was not enough to encourage French population growth solely
within France’s borders; true demographic prowess entailed extensive French settlement of the colonies and support for French families
both in France and in the empire. Ultimately, by imagining France’s
8
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regeneration within the larger context of empire, pronatalists moved
toward more complex ideas about race and population growth more
generally. For instance, pronatalist awareness of the superior birthrates exhibited by French populations in the empire prompted them
to think differently about the concept of French racial decline and the
impact of gender on the larger phenomenon of “race suicide.” Also
illustrating pronatalists’ evolving racial thinking were their responses
to pronatalist measures introduced in certain colonies. In some cases,
as in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, pronatalist policies were focused
almost exclusively on the French settler population. In Madagascar, on
the other hand, where the settler population was relatively small, the
colonial government introduced a different set of pronatalist measures
aimed at decreasing mortality rates and increasing fertility among
Malagasy subjects. Although the policies developed in Madagascar
were strikingly different from those in North Africa, both in terms
of their nature and origin as well as the racial composition of the
populations at which they were directed, metropolitan pronatalists
demonstrated strong interest in and support for both forms of colonial pronatalism. Making sense of this response requires recognizing
that colonial forms of pronatalism were premised on the idea that the
future of the French empire depended on developing demographic
resources, be it French settlers or select populations of colonial subjects. As establishing and maintaining a strong empire was an objective that had everything to do with the depopulation crisis, it is clear
that French pronatalism extended beyond a simple desire to increase
the “French” population of France through a uniform set of measures.
Consequently, one major contribution of this book is the evidence
it offers showing that pronatalists understood their demographic crisis in global terms and positioned their empire as an essential part of
the national regeneration they envisioned. That they thought about
depopulation in global terms is also evident in their mixed response
to fears of “race suicide” among their European rivals. While France’s
population began declining at an earlier date than did the populations
of neighboring European states, depopulation was not a uniquely
French anxiety in the modern period. By the twentieth century most
introduction
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states in Europe had likewise witnessed an appreciable decline in their
population growths and developed policies aimed at improving the
“quality and quantity” of their populations.26 In some states, such as
Germany and Great Britain, governments introduced a more selective form of pronatalism by encouraging higher birthrates in certain
segments of the population and, in Nazi Germany’s case, actively
preventing the population growth of those they considered social
undesirables.27 On the other hand, in Italy and Spain, fascist leaders
Mussolini and Franco pursued pronatalist policies that more closely
resembled those of France.28 Such distinctions aside, most European
states in the twentieth century developed fears of degeneration and
population decline that led to a variety of attempts to bring population growth under state control.29
Pronatalists were well aware of such demographic concerns elsewhere in Europe, and yet, for two reasons, this knowledge did little
to assuage their fears of depopulation. First, pronatalists asserted that
France remained at a numerical disadvantage because its depopulation
crisis had emerged earlier than was the case elsewhere in Europe. Second and more significantly, pronatalists were well aware that birthrates
outside of Europe remained strong and feared that Europe’s position
in the world was weakened by its relatively small population. Initially,
pronatalists’ extra-European demographic concerns were more focused
on Asian populations than on African and American populations.
Throughout the Third Republic, discussions of le péril jaune (“yellow
peril”) were evident in pronatalist literature and typically took one
of two forms. On the one hand were fears that Asia’s population was
so large that it would inevitably “overflow” into Europe and inundate
Europe’s population.30 On the other were concerns that this demographic disparity left French and other European colonies in Asia particularly vulnerable.31 In this respect, Japan, widely believed to have
designs on French Indochina as well as other European colonies in
Asia, was seen as the most formidable threat.32 As both of these two
responses to the “yellow peril” make clear, pronatalists presented this
particular demographic threat both in terms of its implications for
France and its threat to European or Western powers generally. Out10
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side France, nationalists in other European and Western countries
were equally concerned about the rise of Japan and the mass migration of Asian workers in the nineteenth century. For instance, policy
makers in the United States, Australia, and South Africa evoked the
“yellow peril” when crafting restrictive laws designed to limit or prevent Asian immigration.33
Despite the fact that this was a period of intense rivalry between
major European countries and empires, and this competition represented much of the driving force behind French pronatalism, there
was simultaneously a sense of a shared demographic crisis among
rivals. Competitive impulses aside, French pronatalists identified with
other Europeans as members of the same race and believed that inadequate “white” population growth in places like Britain or Germany
had consequences for the race as a whole. One example of this sense
of a shared “European” or even “white” demographic crisis is visible in
a pronatalist brochure titled “The White Race in Danger of Death.”34
Through graphs, illustrations, and statistical charts, the authors of
this brochure sought to persuade the public that declining birthrates
in other European countries gave French people little reason to celebrate; far from diminishing the nature of the crisis, this development only made it more severe.35 Another revealing picture in the
journal of the Alliance nationale depicted Japan as a large Asian man
with an excess of 943,000 births over deaths in the year 1926; Britain,
France, and Germany, however, had a combined excess of 823,000
births over deaths that same year and were depicted collectively as a
smaller European man (fig. 1). Underneath the picture, the caption
explains: “The true ‘Yellow Peril’ will be born of Western European
countries’ insufficient birthrate.”36 When considering the global ramifications of French depopulation, the editors of the journal considered it more relevant to present the birthrates of these three European
rivals as a group. In this way, as they promoted awareness of French
depopulation, pronatalists simultaneously educated the public about
similar developments elsewhere in Europe and linked France’s fate to
that of other European states. By studying French pronatalists’ interest
in empire and support for colonial settlement, this book further eluintroduction
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cidates how pronatalists’ anxieties about a shared European depopulation crisis could exist alongside the persistent demographic rivalry
they felt with Germany and other European states. Once pronatalists
expanded their vision beyond Europe’s borders and conceived of the
issue in global terms, they began to think differently about how they
would strengthen the French birthrate. For one thing, this “imperial
turn” in pronatalist thinking generated impassioned arguments in
favor of developing colonies as a destination for French migration.
Also, in various colonies this global perspective on French depopulation meant envisioning the growth of certain rival European populations and select groups of colonial subjects as part of larger efforts
to safeguard France’s interests.
Ultimately, by exploring French pronatalists’ complex reasons for
supporting empire, this study sheds new light on one of the many myths
that was integral to French imperialism: the idea that the establishment
of an empire made France’s population one hundred million strong.
As many scholars have pointed out, the empire represented more than
vast expanses of land of geopolitical and economic importance; the
empire brought some sixty million colonial subjects under the French
flag, thereby representing a valuable population reservoir.37 One early
proponent of the “population reservoir” theory was Charles Mangin,
who in his 1910 book La force noire argued that West Africa’s abundant population, which he grossly overestimated, could provide muchneeded soldiers for depopulated France’s army.38 Soon after, the benefit
to the metropole of this population became readily apparent when
large numbers of colonial soldiers fought in the French army during
the Great War, filling the void left by those Frenchmen who had never
been born.39 During this same war, other men from France’s African
and Asian colonies arrived in the metropole to fill the labor shortages
created by the departure of many working-class men to the front.40
While many contemporaries may have had their reservations about
the demographic value that the colonies represented for the metropole in this respect, it is important to remember that few pronatalists
regarded France’s colonial subjects as anything more than a temporary solution to France’s demographic troubles. In fact, the idea of
12
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Fig. 1. “Le péril jaune,” Revue de l’alliance nationale contre la dépopulation,
July 1928, 208. Reproduced courtesy of the Bibliothèque nationale de France.

being permanently reliant on colonial subjects to fill France’s population void elicited numerous comparisons with ancient Rome. This
comparison was not surprising given that, as Patricia Lorcin and Jonathan Gosnell have shown, French imperialists often presented the
French empire as the next great Latin empire, continuing where ancient
Rome had left off in not only Gaul, but also North Africa.41 French pronatalists made additional historical connections; the French empire
introduction
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was not only “descended” from that of Rome but was threatened by a
depopulation crisis similar to that which had weakened Rome.42 Like
France, Rome had been obliged to import foreign workers because of
a labor shortage, the Roman countryside became subject to “peaceful colonization” by foreigners, and Rome increasingly relied on colonial soldiers to maintain the large empire that could not be defended
with Roman soldiers alone. Drawing on the example of ancient Rome,
French pronatalists were convinced that the loyalty of colonial soldiers could never be truly ensured and that being outnumbered by,
and excessively reliant upon, France’s colonial subjects was a sign of
weakness, not a solution to depopulation.43 Even if pronatalists saw
some advantages to drawing on the demographic resources of the
colonies during times of crisis, occasionally filling the ranks of the
army and supplying workers to factories, their racial views led them
to reject any notion of depending on non-European populations to
compensate for France’s low fertility. Instead, to pronatalists the demographic potential of empire resided in another myth, the myth of the
prolific settler, or a belief that French settlers on average had a higher
birthrate than their metropolitan compatriots. Ultimately, pronatalists saw the demographic potential of empire less in terms of offsetting France’s numerical inferiority by bringing millions of colonial
subjects under the French flag, and more as an important step on the
road to encouraging a more robust French population growth, both
in the settler communities and the metropole.
Methodology and Chapter Outline

Given the prevalence of demographic anxieties in Third Republic France
and the sheer number of people who in one way or another engaged
this question, it can be challenging to determine who was a pronatalist and what this label meant. Three considerations must therefore be
kept in mind. First, it is important to recognize that the term pronatalist can be broadly applied to encompass individuals who, though
not members of pronatalist organizations, were nevertheless involved
in causes intersecting with demographic questions, something that
led them to collaborate with such organizations or employ pronatal14
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ist rhetoric in their own arguments. For instance, activists seeking the
abolition of regulated prostitution saw their cause as a moral crusade
against a practice that corrupted men and degraded women; moreover, they presented regulated prostitution as a cause of depopulation
due to its association with adultery, the spread of venereal disease, and
women engaging in non-procreational sex.44 In addition to socialreform movements can be added the Roman Catholic Church, whose
leaders, cognizant of the declining influence of religion in French society, presented depopulation as the consequence of a secular government and a less observant population. They joined many pronatalists
in asserting that religious faith was critical to replacing decadence and
individualism with notions of morality and duty. Although the pronatalist movement was by and large male-dominated, in that its leaders were men and its committees predominantly composed of men,
feminists were very assertive in demanding that pronatalists consider
women’s opinions. They were quick to emphasize the absurdity of a
group of men assembling to develop recommendations on breastfeeding, maternal health, and child care without including mothers
in these discussions.45 Many feminists became active members of the
pronatalist movement, attending meetings and giving presentations
at pronatalist congresses and, through their activism, emphasizing
the social importance of women’s political participation.46 To this
end they presented their own goals, such as state support for motherhood and reforming married women’s legal incapacity, as conducive to improving population growth.47
Despite the multiplicity of voices engaging the demographic debate
in the metropole, my research revealed that individuals who published
books about depopulation, were active members of pronatalist organizations, or were directly involved in promoting colonial settlement
were the most inclined to present imperialism as a solution to French
demographic decline. The Catholic Church in France was an active
participant in discussions about the birthrate, but it largely addressed
this issue separately from that of empire. Catholic missionaries in the
empire, though very important in establishing French influence in
the colonies, seemed similarly disinclined to treat the two questions
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simultaneously.48 In addition to their active engagement of demographic questions, feminists were interested in empire, whether that
meant investigating the condition of colonized women or attempting
to carve out a greater role for women in the public sphere. Yet, with the
exception of Mme Léon Pégard, whose work will be discussed extensively in chapter 2, feminists generally treated depopulation and imperialism separately. The most likely reason why feminists and Catholic
clergy did not articulate the demographic question in this particular
way is that the birthrate was only one of many issues with which they
concerned themselves, and they generally only engaged this question
insofar as it related to their primary objectives. Pronatalist organizations, on the other hand, established with the goal of devoting all
of their energy to finding ways to improve population growth, were
subsequently at the forefront of identifying a wide array of potential
solutions to depopulation, solutions that included colonial emigration
and drawing inspiration from colonial initiatives. It is for this reason
that this book focuses mostly on those individuals and organizations
primarily involved in either promoting colonial settlement or developing reforms to address French demographic decline.
Second, within the organized pronatalist movement there were many
different organizations and approaches to achieving the mutual goal of
stronger demographic growth. For instance, the Ligue pour la vie had
Catholic roots, whereas the Alliance nationale pour l’accroissement
de la population française had a strong secular and republican tone
under the leadership of Jacques Bertillon, though it did move in more
conservative directions during the 1920s.49 Within these and related
organizations there was a diversity of opinion as some activists focused
their energy almost exclusively on finding ways to increase the birthrate and others, suspecting that such measures were not particularly
efficacious, prioritized reforms that would reduce infant mortality.
Most pronatalists developed agendas combining both approaches,
and, as will be seen in this study, empire impinged on discussions
about both decreasing infant mortality and increasing the birthrate.
Also crucial to this study are organizations that were familialist as opposed to pronatalist. According to Paul Smith, one of the
16
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key differences between the two ideologies is that pronatalism was
“quantitative,” in that its adherents sought measures that would boost
population growth.50 Familialists, on the other hand, were more concerned with the moral quality of the French family and with representing the interests of the famille nombreuse (large family). Familialist
organizations typically restricted their membership to people with a
designated number of children, something that distinguished them
from the Alliance nationale, and were focused primarily on securing reforms intended to alleviate the financial challenges of raising a
large family and to elevate the social importance of fathers of many
children. These differences aside, familialists and pronatalists shared
many of the same objectives and collaborated with one another during and after the Great War. Pronatalists considered policies extending financial assistance to large families an integral part of raising
the birthrate, and they promoted the idea that people who had large
families deserved to be respected and commended for their sacrifices.
Familialists shared pronatalists’ concerns about the declining French
birthrate and lamented how few French people were willing to follow
their example and have numerous children. It is for this reason that in
chapters 4 and 5, which focus on the decades after World War I, this
study utilizes both familialist and pronatalist sources.
The third and final consideration is that pronatalism, as a concept
and a program for political reform, evolved considerably during the
seventy years examined in this study. In the first decades of the Third
Republic, pronatalist reformers built on the existing impetus to reduce
high rates of infant mortality and saw their greatest success in introducing legislation designed to protect young children, most notably
two laws in 1874 that strengthened government oversight of the wetnursing trade and placed restrictions on child labor. In the 1880s and
1890s, pronatalists increasingly advocated measures that would encourage a higher birthrate as opposed to simply reducing child mortality.
Many of the proposals during this period reflected the growing focus
on motherhood and aimed to limit how many hours per day women
could work outside the home, restrict pregnant women’s work before
and after the delivery, and assist indigent and unmarried mothers. The
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focus on “protecting” mothers, regardless of the circumstances under
which they became pregnant, is most evident in the 1912 law allowing recherche de la paternité (paternity suits), a measure that enabled
unmarried mothers to seek financial support from their child’s father.
The extreme loss of life during World War I, as well the war’s impact
on gender roles and family life, marked a new phase in the pronatalist
movement as it made the depopulation crisis more urgent and compelling to the French public and the nation’s leaders. In addition to seeing
a growth in their memberships in the aftermath of the war, pronatalists and familialists in the 1920s increasingly asserted that the family,
as a unit, had rights distinct from the individual, and with such arguments they successfully secured greater benefits and financial advantages for fathers and large families. The new concept of family rights
was most evident in the campaigns for the family vote in the 1920s
and 1930s. During this period there was also a renewed emphasis on
discouraging family planning, most notably with the 1920 legislation
banning the sale and advertisement of contraceptives and strengthening penalties for abortion.51 Generally, the pronatalist movement
moved in more-conservative directions during these years, particularly after 1934, when organizations such as the Alliance nationale
increasingly worked with right-wing groups.52
Using these larger developments as a backdrop against which to
assess the impact of imperialism on French pronatalism, the chapters
that follow, organized chronologically, collectively demonstrate that
pronatalists supported colonial emigration and settlement as solutions
to French depopulation, studied the pronatalist initiatives of colonial
administrators, and collaborated with analogous settler organizations. The first two chapters focus specifically on migration. Chapter
1 explains how and why settler colonialism became an essential part
of the pronatalist agenda. It was the desire to establish healthy patterns of migration in order to trigger population growth that turned
pronatalists into proponents of colonial expansion and settlement.
This development had its origins in academic debates in the 1860s and
1870s about the impact of migration on individuals’ family-planning
decisions. Prominent demographers, led by Louis-Adolphe Bertillon,
18
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theorized that colonial emigration improved the demographic health
of the nation but worried that France lacked a suitable destination for
its emigrants because few French colonies were located in temperate
zones where colonists acclimatized easily. This view changed in 1880
with the publication of Dr. René Ricoux’s statistical study revealing
that French settlers in Algeria had a birthrate exceeding that of the
metropole. These findings not only produced more optimistic assessments of France’s prospects for establishing a large settler colony in
Algeria but also gave birth to the myth of the prolific settler. This
image of colonial demographic strength was based on gendered ideas
about individuals’ family-planning decisions that ultimately shaped
pronatalist arguments in favor of colonial expansion and settlement
throughout the Third Republic.
Ideas about the causes of depopulation and the demographic benefits of colonial emigration resonated beyond pronatalist circles and
influenced French efforts to recruit men and women for colonial settlement. As chapter 2 explains, relatively few French people migrated
to the colonies in the late nineteenth century, a problem that the Union
coloniale française (ucf) attributed in large part to the low birthrate.
Focusing on the 1890s and the first decade of the twentieth century
when the ucf was active in encouraging migration to the colonies,
this chapter explores how the ucf expanded the myth of the prolific
settler by developing ideas about why it was in the colonies that the
French were likely to achieve what seemed difficult in France: a more
stable gender order and a higher birthrate. They constructed the male
colonial settler as a symbolically powerful countertype to the urban,
metropolitan man who displayed all the wrong qualities thereby contributing to both the low birthrate and France’s failure to settle its colonies. Through this image of colonial masculinity, both imperialists
and pronatalists expressed their class-based and gendered anxieties
about modernity. Concerns about depopulation also impinged on the
ucf’s efforts to recruit more women for colonial settlement, leading
them to focus on women who struggled to find husbands and employment. In contrast to how the ucf appealed to prospective male settlers, the Société française d’émigration des femmes (sfef) presented
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itself as a charitable organization that would provide women, who in
this modern society struggled to fulfill their traditional roles as wives
and mothers, with jobs in the empire. Although their first priority
was matching these women with careers, it was expected that women
would marry soon after arriving in the colonies and that their migration would contribute to the growth of French settler populations.
As these two chapters indicate, late-nineteenth-century pronatalists, like many French people, often thought about the empire in
abstract terms, bringing together diverse peoples and administrative
units into a single geographic space as they promoted the benefits of
migration to “the empire.” This vision of the empire was not entirely
fictional, as the government did take some steps toward centralizing
the colonial administration in the late nineteenth century by establishing a ministry of colonies as well as the École coloniale to train
civil servants for colonial posts.53 In the twentieth century this unified, abstract idea of empire would be expressed in the term “greater
France,” the notion of an expanded French nation of which both the
metropole and colonies were integral parts.
That said, when it came to population policies in the colonies, pronatalists were well aware that methods of rule and administration varied substantially from one colony to the next. My research revealed
that certain colonies were of greater interest and symbolic value to pronatalists than were others. This study draws on the example of recent
studies that focus on the role of select colonies in shaping larger policy, rather than looking at the empire as a whole or studying a single
colony in isolation.54 To that end, chapters 3, 4, and 5 are structured
as case studies focusing on population policies introduced in those
colonies of particular interest to pronatalists and analyzing how, as
they developed strategies to encourage French population growth,
pronatalists understood colonial developments. Although there were
French settlers all over the empire, and colonial authorities introduced
pronatalist policies in a number of different places, the developments
in colonies such as French West Africa seemed to generate relatively
little interest among French pronatalists.55 In fact, pronatalist discussions of empire mostly focused on four places: Algeria, Tunisia,
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Morocco, and Madagascar. That Algeria would play a role in shaping French pronatalism is not surprising given that this colony was
always exceptional in the French colonial imagination. Its conquest,
initiated in 1830, marked the beginning of France’s pursuit of a new
empire. By the Third Republic the colony was seen as part of France
due to its administrative assimilation, its large French settler population, and its proximity to the metropole. For the purposes of this
study, Algeria was an important destination for French colonial emigrants, although pronatalists did envision French settlement of other
colonies as well, and, even after French colonial migration declined
in the early twentieth century, settlers in Algeria continued to shape
larger debates about family rights in the 1920s and 1930s. Also significant to French pronatalists were Tunisia and Morocco. Joining
France’s empire in 1881 and 1912, respectively, these two protectorates were frequently associated with Algeria, as all three formed part
of France’s North African empire. Morocco and Tunisia were nevertheless seen in a different light, since they had fewer settlers and were
administered indirectly, with residents-general reporting to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As that relationship suggests, these protectorates were never imagined as an extension of France or even as colonies
properly speaking. Still, they, like Algeria, were considered suitable
for more extensive French settlement and played an important role in
interwar debates about family rights and suffrage reform. Madagascar, seemingly the outlier in this study, being much further away from
the metropole and a less popular destination for French migrants, was
nevertheless significant because of the pronatalist decrees introduced
there in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This colony joined the empire in 1896 and was ruled directly, unlike Tunisia
and Morocco, with an appointed governor-general reporting to the
Ministry of Colonies.
Chapter 3 begins in the 1890s, a time when French pronatalists became more organized and sought to develop a comprehensive approach to encouraging population growth, one that initially
focused on motherhood and protecting young children. For this reason, they took great interest in the work of colonial governments seekintroduction
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ing to increase their respective populations and pave the way for future
French settlement. The first such colony to shape pronatalism in this
way was Madagascar. Declaring the island “underpopulated” and lacking a sufficient labor force, Governor-General Joseph Gallieni introduced a series of decrees between 1896 and 1905 designed to increase
the population of the Merina people who lived in the central highlands of the island. Like pronatalists in France, Gallieni thought about
depopulation in gendered terms, targeting Merina men and women
in different ways and positioning motherhood as a centerpiece of his
pronatalist decrees. Yet his initiatives were also informed by the colonial context in which they developed as well as his racialized thinking. Pronatalists eyed developments in Madagascar with interest and
saw in Gallieni a “man of action” who was willing to address depopulation in a way that their own government seemed disinclined to do.
Moreover, they considered Gallieni’s reforms equally applicable to
their efforts to confront the gendered causes of French racial decline.
They therefore embraced Gallieni’s population policies, despite the fact
that these efforts were designed to increase a population that was not
French. This shows that French pronatalism extended beyond simple
efforts to increase numbers of French people. Addressing depopulation required solidifying France’s position outside Europe, an objective that, it was believed, could only be accomplished by establishing
demographically strong colonies.
By World War I, metropolitan pronatalists had become more successful at pushing proposed laws through France’s parliament and witnessed a significant increase in their memberships. Yet, despite these
achievements, birthrates continued to decline, and the loss of over a
million young French men during the Great War rendered the pronatalist movement increasingly desperate to address the crisis by whatever means possible. As chapter 4 explains, it was thus in the interwar
years that redefining citizenship by introducing familial suffrage, a
system of voting in which parents receive supplemental votes to represent their children, gained credibility and dominated the pronatalist
discourse of the period. Although familial suffrage was never enacted
in France, it was introduced in Tunisia in 1922 and Morocco in 1926.
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In their decision to implement familial suffrage, French officials in
Tunisia and Morocco made clear connections between the strength of
the French settler family and the maintenance of colonial rule. In each
context, French settlers were outnumbered by both colonial subjects
and other Europeans. Chapter 4 illustrates how pronatalist objectives
could be more powerful and politically expedient in a colonial context. To colonial officials, the maintenance of colonial rule required
encouraging French population growth. Because of the importance
of the French settler family to these objectives, officials were inclined
to think about political participation in familial, as opposed to individual or egalitarian, terms. This shift in political thought was particularly significant for metropolitan pronatalists, who urged their
government to distinguish between male citizens on the basis of their
contributions to overall population growth.
In the interwar years, the concept of family rights dominated the
pronatalist movement. As the French state increasingly extended benefits to French families, benefits that many pronatalists considered
to be fundamental rights, the disparity between raising a family in
France and raising one in North Africa became all the more evident
and acute. Chapter 5 explores the emergence of familialist organizations in the North African settler communities after World War I
and shows how these organizations were focused largely on acquiring
the same family rights as their compatriots in France. While in the
nineteenth century pronatalists viewed the settler colonies in North
Africa to be models of demographic stability, this perception changed
in the 1920s due to the activism of the familialist movement and studies revealing a relative reduction in settler population growth. Fears
of French depopulation in North Africa represented a departure from
the optimism that Dr. Ricoux’s study had inspired decades earlier;
yet, pronatalists in France continued to see settler colonialism as an
important component of their efforts to improve French population
growth. In fact, during this period, metropolitan pronatalists were
more interested in empire than ever before. This transformation can
in part be understood as a reflection of the general growth of interest
in empire seen in French society during the interwar years. Yet, as this
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chapter argues, metropolitan pronatalists’ growing commitment to
empire can be attributed equally to the emergence of settler familialist
organizations. Despite many similarities between the groups, demographic concerns in North Africa differed fundamentally from those
of the metropole. Nevertheless, because of the collaboration between
these groups, the specific needs and concerns of the settler populations became part of the metropolitan pronatalist agenda. Studying
this collaboration reveals, therefore, that French pronatalism should
not be viewed as an exclusively metropolitan political movement that
developed solely within France.
The conclusion explores the legacy of the myths, detailed earlier in
the book, of the prolific settler and the influence of imperialism on individuals’ family-planning decisions. It begins by looking at the introduction of the Code de la famille, a systematic approach to addressing
depopulation that was introduced shortly before France’s entrance
into World War II and foreshadowed the efforts that Vichy officials
would soon undertake to improve the birthrate and strengthen the
French family. Following France’s defeat in 1940, the French empire
represented hope during these uncertain times, just as it had in 1871.
While Vichy officials attributed French defeat to the inadequacies
of the Third Republic and the decadence of French society, they saw
settlers and colonial life in a very different way. Representing health
and virility, colonial settlers were supposedly untainted by the decadence that characterized metropolitan life and were subsequently
central to the national regeneration Vichy officials envisioned. Furthermore, despite France’s defeat, many of the colonies were under
Vichy’s control and remained a symbol of French power. The history
of colonial pronatalism and its interaction with that of the metropole
thus sheds considerable light on why pronatalists in both France and
the settler colonies later embraced Vichy’s National Revolution. Ultimately, as this book demonstrates, pronatalists during and after the
Third Republic believed that establishing and maintaining large settler colonies was essential to restoring demographic growth and safeguarding France’s position in the world.
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